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The availability of the secured debt expense1 to debtors intending to 
surrender collateral as part of their chapter 7 bankruptcy case is a heavily 
debated question that has sharply divided bankruptcy courts since the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act (BAPCPA) in 2005.2 The question is a straightforward one: When 
completing the means test calculation, may a consumer debtor deduct 
payments due for secured debts on the petition date if the debtor intends 
to surrender or has surrendered the collateral securing the underlying 
obligation.3 
Traditionally, a majority of the courts considering the question have 
allowed the deduction in chapter 7 cases irrespective of the debtor’s plans 
for the collateral post-petition; a minority of bankruptcy courts interpret 
the expense using a “future oriented” or “forward-looking” approach.4 
Courts using the latter approach deny the chapter 7 debtor the benefit of 
the expense if the debtor intends to surrender the collateral and, therefore, 
will not in reality be making payments on the obligation post-petition.5 On 
the heels of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamilton v. 
                                                                                                             
1 The phrase “secured debt expense” or “secured debt deduction” refers to 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (West 2018). 
2 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); 
see infra Part III. 
3 See generally Mark Goldman, Leading Lawyers on Preparing a Chapter 7 Filing, 
Establishing Effective Client Strategies, and Understanding Recent Trends, 2010 WL 
1976163, at *7-8 (2010). 
4 In re White, 512 B.R. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014) (recognizing the split in authority 
and summarizing the conflicting “snapshot” and “future oriented” approaches applied by 
the bankruptcy courts when interpreting section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Code); In re 
Rivers, 466 B.R. 558 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[P]rior to 2010, the vast majority of courts 
to consider this issue [] concluded that the plain language of the statute permits a Chapter 
7 debtor to deduct payments on secured debt even when the debtor plans to surrender post-
petition the collateral underlying the debt.”); In re Kogler, 368 B.R. 785 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 
2007) (stating that, since the implementation of BAPCPA, two distinctive lines of cases 
have emerged as courts struggle with the issue of whether to allow a debtor to deduct 
secured debt payments for collateral that will be surrendered). 
5 In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131, 133 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Fredman, 471 
B.R. 540, 551 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); In re Krawczyk, No. 11-09596-8-JRL, 2012 WL 
3069437, at *3-5 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 27, 2012). 
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Lanning6 and Ransom v. FIA Card Services,7 however, a new trend has 
emerged.8 Spurred by the Court’s dicta in these two decisions, a growing 
number of bankruptcy courts have begun to apply the forward-looking 
approach to deny debtors the benefit of this allowance in chapter 7 
consumer liquidation cases.9 
In sharp contrast to earlier cases where bankruptcy courts focused on 
determining the applicability of the secured debt expense by focusing on 
the Code’s language, the newer cases that are representative of this trend 
notably lack analysis of the statutory text.10 Instead, courts are willing to 
bypass the language of the statute or discernment of its plain meaning in 
favor of an interpretation that will, in their opinion, best conform to the 
“spirit” of BAPCPA.11 Underlying the trend is the assumption that 
Congress made a mistake by drafting language into the means test that 
essentially allows debtors to pull one over on creditors: this language 
permits the consumer debtor to deduct phantom expenses that artificially 
decrease the amount of debtor’s disposable income and, thereby, allow the 
debtor to escape his financial obligations through a chapter 7 bankruptcy 
case.12 According to these courts, this amounts to a free pass, permitting 
the debtor to continue his chapter 7 case without getting caught by the 
means test’s presumption of abuse.13 To fix this and inject a much needed 
dose of realism into the chapter 7 means test, these courts posit that the 
expense must be given a forward-looking interpretation that focuses on 
whether the debtor will incur the expense post-petition and, therefore, 
allows the deduction from CMI only when the debtor reaffirms the 
obligation that is secured by the collateral.14 
But, while this approach may seem more in line with the broad 
purposes underlying BAPCPA, it is not supported by the statute’s 
language or the larger context of the chapter 7 dismissal statute.15 More 
importantly, this trend has far reaching consequences for consumer 
debtors that raise concerns of equity and fairness. In chapter 7 cases where 
a debtor fails the means test as a result of being denied the use of the 
expense, this interpretation of the statute imposes an onerous and unfair 
                                                                                                             
6 Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 508-09 (2010). 
7 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., 562 U.S. 61, 65 (2011). 
8 Id.; see also infra Part II(C). 
9 See infra Part III. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Christopher W. Frost, Nagging Problems under BAPCPA post Lanning and Ransom, 
32 No. 11 Bankruptcy Law Letter 1 (Nov. 2012). 
13 In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 555 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 
872, 880 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011). 
14 See infra Part III. 
15 See infra Part III. 
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burden on the debtor who will have to disprove abuse in order to continue 
his chapter 7 case.16 Conversely, this approach allows the bankruptcy 
trustee to benefit from an initial presumption of abuse without having to 
meet the evidentiary burden of proving abuse through the totality of 
circumstances or bad faith tests.17 Such an absurd result cannot be what 
Congress intended when it created three separate and distinct tests in 
section 707(b)(2) for determining whether the dismissal of debtor’s 
chapter 7 case for abuse is proper. 
This new approach also raises a broader question regarding the use of 
judicial discretion after BAPCPA and whether bankruptcy courts should 
go beyond the statutory text, or bypass it completely, to fix what the courts 
perceive to be a broken means test – one that produces results that do not 
align with the courts’ interpretation of the test’s purpose. A careful 
analysis of the cases using this approach show that attempts to fix the 
perceived accuracy of the means test calculation through piecemeal 
judicial interpretation of its parts, creates a much larger problem and one 
that may ultimately jeopardize debtors’ ability to obtain bankruptcy 
relief.18 
This article examines the growing trend among bankruptcy courts to 
selectively adopt a new kind of forward-looking approach when 
determining the applicability of the secured debt expense to a chapter 7 
case and the negative effects of this growing trend on consumer debtors. 
Part II of this article discusses the key distinctions between chapter 7 and 
chapter 13 bankruptcy cases and how those differences must inform the 
interpretation to be given by the bankruptcy courts to the secured debt 
expense statute, section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the bankruptcy code. This 
section also analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Hamilton v. Lanning and Ransom v. FIA Card Services, the two cases to 
spark the trend toward a future-oriented or forward-looking means test in 
chapter 7 consumer cases. Part III begins by discussing what has been 
labeled the “majority approach,” an approach focused on discerning the 
plain meaning of the statutory language in section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), as 
well as the significance of that language in the broader context of the 
means test, including the purpose and effect of the other dismissal tests in 
section 707(b)(3) of the bankruptcy code. Part III then analyzes the most 
recent bankruptcy decisions interpreting the secured debt expense after the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lanning and Ransom, or what 
is referred to throughout this article as the “trend cases.” It argues that a 
textual and contextual analysis of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) supports the 
                                                                                                             
16 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2018). 
17 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (West 2018). 
18 See infra Part III. 
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conclusion that means testing in chapter 7 bankruptcy cases is 
incompatible with the forward-looking approach being increasingly 
adopted by bankruptcy courts. Finally, part IV of this article discusses the 
negative effects of a means test that, although designed by Congress to be 
mechanical in its application, is interpreted to selectively incorporate one 
forward-looking element. It concludes that a mechanical means test with 
one select forward-looking element is inequitable and imposes a 
significant if not insurmountable evidentiary burden on the debtor when 
that element results in a presumption of abuse being triggered. This forces 
the debtor to make an initial show of proof that he deserves a fresh start – 
an approach at odds with the statutory text, inconsistent with the purposes 
underlying means testing, and contrary to longstanding bankruptcy policy. 
II. THE MEANS TEST IN CHAPTER 7 AND CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY 
CASES: COMPARING APPLES AND ORANGES 
The means test is a mathematical calculation that in chapter 7 
bankruptcy cases may trigger a presumption that the case is an abuse of 
the bankruptcy laws.19 As codified in section 707(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the means test is merely the first of three distinct 
methods through which the United States Trustee or other party in interest 
may prove “abuse” of the bankruptcy laws by the debtor and, accordingly, 
seek to have debtor’s chapter 7 case dismissed.20 This calculation is used 
to assess the debtor’s income and expenses, allowing the bankruptcy court 
to easily determine whether the debtor should be eligible for chapter 7 
relief based strictly on the numbers.21 As such, the means test has been 
described as nothing more than a screening mechanism or objective litmus 
test to be applied as of the petition date to determine whether a chapter 7 
proceeding is appropriate.22 
The starting point for the means test calculation is debtor’s “current 
monthly income,” or CMI, a monetary amount that is determined by 
                                                                                                             
19 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (West 2018). 
20 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2) (West 2018); § 707(b)(3) (West 2018); see also In re Rivers, 
466 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[T]he means test is only the first step of a 
two-tiered inquiry under section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
21 In re Castillo, No. 08-10878-PGH, 2008 WL 4544467, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Oct. 
10, 2008). 
22 In re White, 512 B.R. 822, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014) (noting that the means test 
is intended to determine the debtor’s eligibility for chapter 7 relief as of the petition date); 
In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[T]he Means Test serves as a 
‘screening mechanism to determine whether a Chapter 7 proceeding is appropriate’”); see 
generally Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 477 (2007). 
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looking retrospectively at the debtor’s income from all sources during the 
six months preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case.23 From that 
amount, the debtor may deduct certain monthly expenses; the type of 
expense a debtor may claim and its specific amount is set forth by statute.24 
Most of these expenses are based on National or Local Standards and, as 
such are applied uniformly throughout the geographic regions to which the 
expense is applicable.25 With very few exceptions, these expense 
allowances will not accurately represent debtor’s actual or current 
expenses.26 When the result of this calculation, the debtor’s disposable 
income, is above the statutory threshold set in section 707(b)(2)(A)(i) of 
the bankruptcy code, the debtor fails the means test and the case is 
presumed to be an abuse of the bankruptcy laws and must be dismissed.27 
The secured debt expense, found in section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the 
bankruptcy code, allows a debtor to subtract from his CMI an amount 
equal to the monthly payments contractually due to secured creditors in 
the sixty months following the petition date.28 Its effect is to decrease a 
debtor’s disposable income and, thereby, make it more likely that this 
amount will not trigger a presumption of abuse.29 In some consumer cases, 
the secured debt expense may be the sole expense that keeps a debtor 
below the statutory threshold that will trigger a presumption of abuse.30 In 
other cases, it may be the single largest allowance to reduce the debtor’s 
CMI on the means test calculation. Irrespective, where this expense allows 
a debtor to pass the means test, the case will still be subject to dismissal 
for abuse upon a showing that the debtor filed the chapter 7 case in bad 
                                                                                                             
23 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) (West 2018); § 101(10A) (West 2018); 
24 § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(V); (iii); (iv). 
25 Id. 
26 In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 562 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[T]he bulk of the allowable 
deductions are fixed amounts, based upon the IRS National Standards and Local Standards, 
not based on a debtor’s actual expenses . . . .”); In re Ralston, 400 B.R. 854, 868 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2009); In re Castillo, No. 08-10878-PGH, 2008 WL 4544467, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. Oct. 10, 2008). 
27 § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II) (“In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of 
relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall presume abuse 
exists if the debtor’s current monthly income reduced by the amounts determined under 
clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv), and multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of 25 percent of 
the debtor’s non-priority unsecured claims in the case, or $7,700, whichever is greater; or 
$12,850.”). 
28 § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I). 
29 Id. 
30 See generally In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 872 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re 
Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131, 136 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 555 
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012). 
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faith or that a totality of circumstances proves that debtor can afford to pay 
at least some of his outstanding debts.31 
When it enacted BAPCPA, Congress chose to incorporate the means 
test calculation into both chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases, giving the 
calculation a unique role in each chapter.32 Accordingly, given the 
different types of bankruptcy relief offered by each chapter and their 
different policy objectives, the secured debt expense must be understood 
within the broader context of the means test itself and its unique function 
in chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases respectively.33 
A. The Need for a Reality Based Means Test in Chapter 13 Cases. 
In chapter 7 consumer cases a debtor’s non-exempt assets are 
liquidated to pay unsecured creditors and the debtor is discharged from his 
personal liability on these claims. Accordingly, a debtor’s post-petition 
earnings are wholly his own and part of debtor’s bankruptcy “fresh start.” 
In these cases, the means test functions as a kind of gatekeeper that 
ultimately determines whether an above-median debtor is eligible for this 
extraordinary remedy. 
Although, in theory, the amount yielded by the means test calculation 
is what the debtor could presumably pay to creditors over the life of a 
hypothetical five-year Chapter 13 Plan, in reality, the figure is unlikely to 
                                                                                                             
31 § 707(b)(3) (West 2018) (“In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of 
relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter in a case in which the presumption 
in paragraph (2)(A)(i) does not arise or is rebutted, the court shall consider – (A) whether 
the debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or (B) the totality of circumstances . . . of the 
debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse.”). 
32 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 65 n.1 (“Chapter 13 borrows the means test from Chapter 7, 
where it is used as a screening mechanism to determine whether a Chapter 7 proceeding is 
appropriate.”); In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 566 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (noting that the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of the means test in chapter 
13 cases differs significantly from its purpose in chapter 7 cases); In re Ralston, 400 B.R. 
854, 856 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Radically different purpose of ‘means test’ as applied 
in chapter 7 as mechanical test of whether bankruptcy petition is presumptively 
abusive . . . .”). 
33 See In re Denzin, 534 B.R. 883, 887 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015) (“The chapter 7 means 
test in § 707(b)(2) and the chapter 13 means test in § 1325(b) do not necessarily result in 
the same amount. This is understandable because they serve two different purposes, one to 
guard the door to chapter 7 relief and the other to determine how much should be paid to 
creditors in chapter 13.”); see also In re Grinkmeyer, 456 B.R. 385, 388-89 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ind. 2011) (emphasizing that the chapter 13 means test, used to determine the debtor’s 
projected disposable income, and the chapter 7 means test, used to determine if a 
presumption of abuse arises in chapter 7 cases, are based on distinctly different 
considerations); In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 905, 910 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (stating 
that a “distinct analysis” of the means test must be undertaken in chapter 7 and chapter 13 
cases because there are different considerations with respect to how issues arising under 
these respective chapters are handled). 
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accurately reflect debtor’s actual repayment capacity. By congressional 
design the calculation does not use the debtor’s actual or “real” income or 
expenses.34 The income portion of the calculation is strictly backward 
looking; probable or actual increases in the debtor’s income post-petition 
are not calculated into debtor’s CMI in chapter 7 bankruptcy cases.35 The 
type and amount of allowable expenses, with very few exceptions, is 
statutorily prescribed.36 Even if a debtor’s actual expenses exceed the 
amounts allowed by the statute, the debtor may claim an allowance only 
for the specified sum rather than for the debtor’s real expenditures.37 As 
with the income portion of the calculation, post-petition fluctuations in 
debtor’s expenses are not considered.38 Accordingly, although Congress 
                                                                                                             
34 In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. at 910 (“Congress chose to base the means test on 
historic income and expense figures that are in effect on the petition date, as opposed to 
figures that may change with the passage of time or with a change in debtor’s lifestyle.”); 
In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 545 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012) (“The statute sets allowable 
expenses by means of several different methods, and, like section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), many 
other provisions of the means test appear to operate contrary to the goal of accurately 
determining the amount of income that would actually be available for payments to 
unsecured creditors in a Chapter 13 case.”); Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial 
Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 477 (2007). 
35 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A); In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595, 602 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2007); see also In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 317 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (“Calculations under 
the means test are purposefully circumscribed and should not include foreseeable 
circumstances . . . .”); In re Walker, No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL 1314125, at *6 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006); In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 465 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). 
36 11 U.S.C.A § 707(b)(2)(A) (West 2018). 
37 In fact, in chapter 7 cases, the statute allows the court to consider the debtor’s real 
income and expenses, or post-petition fluctuations in debtor’s income and expenses, only 
when the debtor seeks to rebut the presumption of abuse that results after the debtor “fails” 
the means test by establishing “special circumstances.” Even then, the debtor must first 
prove that “special circumstances” warrant a downward or upward adjustment of the 
statutorily prescribed income and expense figures respectively–an evidentiary burden that 
is exceedingly difficult for a debtor to prove in most jurisdictions. Additionally, the debtor 
must then show that, once the income and expense figures are adjusted, debtor’s disposable 
income falls below the statutory threshold that will trigger the presumption of abuse and 
that, therefore, debtor “passes” the means test due to his “special circumstances.” In re 
Prestwood, 451 B.R. 180, 184 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2011). 
38 See In re Haman, 366 B.R. at 317 (noting that, instead, such future circumstances are 
properly considered under the totality analysis of section 707(b)(3)); see In re Hartwick, 
359 B.R. 16, 21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (“Congress did not remove the ability of bankruptcy 
courts to consider circumstances including postpetition developments, in determining 
abuse. On the contrary, Congress expressly incorporated the formerly judicially created 
totality of the circumstances test which permits consideration of circumstances both 
preceding and following the filing of the petition.”); In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 465 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (The impact of postpetition events are not part of the means test. 
If the UST wishes the bankruptcy court to consider post-petition events, she may not rely 
on a presumption of abuse under the means test, but must bring her motion to dismiss under 
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sought to create a uniform test that would identify abuse of the bankruptcy 
process using a straightforward mathematical calculation that would be 
applied equally to all consumer debtors, the very nature of the calculation 
and the uniformity of its components militates against the means test being 
able to function as an accurate realistic measure of debtor’s actual 
repayment capacity. As such, the means test is mechanical, based only 
superficially on debtor’s financial reality, and merely creates a bright line 
presumptive test of eligibility for chapter 7 relief that is to be applied as of 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition.39 In In re Henebury, for example, the 
court noted: “[T]he means test presents a backward looking litmus test 
performed using mathematical computations of arbitrary numbers, often 
having little to do with a particular debtor’s actual circumstances and 
ability to pay a portion of debt.”40 At best, in chapter 7 cases, the means 
test can provide only a limited approximation of debtor’s disposable 
income. 
Accordingly, in chapter 7 cases, Congress designed section 707(b) so 
as to create a two-part abuse analysis.41 Part one, the means test 
calculation, is mechanical and designed to look backwards at the state of 
debtor’s financial affairs as of the petition date.42 Part two, codified in 
section 707(b)(3), allows the court to consider debtor’s real finances, 
including post-petition changes in income and expenses, to more 
                                                                                                             
section 707(b)(1) or (b)(3) and satisfy the burden of proof without the benefit of any 
presumption). 
39 See In re Castillo, No. 08-10878-PGH, 2008 WL 4544467, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
Oct. 10, 2008); In re Henebury, 361 B.R. at 603 (“Congress has already determined the 
fairness of application of the means test, and a major objective of the legislation was to 
remove judicial discretion from the process.”); In re White, 512 B.R. 822, 827 (Bankr. 
N.D. Miss. 2014) (“[T]he means test is intended to determine a debtor’s eligibility for 
chapter 7 relief as of the petition date without regard to known future circumstances which 
impact a debtor’s income or expenses.”); In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 545 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ill. 2012) (“[T]he means test is intended to determine a debtor’s eligibility for chapter 7 
relief at a specific point in time without regard to the accuracy of that determination.”). 
40 In re Henebury, 361 B.R. at 603; see also In re Hartwick, 352 B.R. 867, 870 (Bankr. 
D. Minn. 2006); Ned W. Waxman & Justin H. Rucki, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Abuse: Means 
Testing is Presumptive, but “Totality” is Determinative, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 907 (2008) 
(“[T]he means test is merely a presumption of abuse based on a snapshot at the moment of 
filing of the bankruptcy petition, and it is not necessarily indicative of the debtor’s actual 
financial condition.”). 
41 See In re Denzin, 534 B.R. 883, 886 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015) (“If a prospective chapter 
7 debtor satisfies the § 707(b)(2) means test, he must also satisfy a second test to qualify 
for chapter 7, § 707(b)(3).”); In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) 
(“§ 707(b)(3) is but one of two subordinate paragraphs used to determine whether a case 
should be dismissed for abuse pursuant to § 707(b)(1). The other, contained in § 707(b)(2), 
sets forth a formulaic approach, known as the ‘means test’ . . . .”). 
42 See In re Denzin, 534 B.R. at 886-87. 
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accurately reflect debtor’s repayment capacity.43 If a debtor “fails” the 
means test, it bestows on the bankruptcy trustee the benefit of a 
presumption of abuse that, when triggered, requires the dismissal of 
debtor’s chapter 7 case without any additional proffer of evidence of 
debtor’s “abuse” by the trustee.44 By contrast, where the presumption of 
abuse is not triggered because debtor “passes” the means test, the trustee 
or a party in interest wanting to dismiss the debtor’s chapter 7 case for 
abuse must seek dismissal under section 707(b)(3) and prove that a totality 
of circumstances shows that debtor’s chapter 7 case is an abuse of the 
bankruptcy laws or that the debtor filed his petition in bad faith.45 
An analysis of section 707(b) show that a forward-looking 
interpretation of the secured debt expense is inconsistent with the function, 
context, and purpose of the means test calculation in chapter 7 bankruptcy 
cases as such an interpretation effectively allows bankruptcy courts to 
pluck one allowable expense from the broader context of the means test 
calculation and single it out for special treatment–making it the only part 
of the means test calculation in a chapter 7 case selectively interpreted by 
the court to reflect post-petition changes to the debtor’s expenses.46 By 
extension, such an interpretation of the secured debt expense ignores the 
purpose and function of section 707(b)(3), a provision specifically added 
by Congress to the dismissal statute to give bankruptcy courts some 
discretion to assess debtor’s real financial circumstances in cases where 
                                                                                                             
43 See In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 561 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“§ 707(b) provides a 
two-step process to detect and deter abusive filers: the . . . objective means test prescribed 
in § 707(b)(2), and the more subjective test of [section] 707(b)(3) which requires an 
analysis of the facts of a particular case.”); In re Denzin, 534 B.R. at 886-87. 
44 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2); In re Ervin, No. 15-70467, 2016 WL 721043, at *7 (Bankr. 
W.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2016) (noting that BAPCPA expressly provides that, after a presumption 
of abuse has been established under section 707(b)(2), the burden of persuasion shifts to 
the debtor to demonstrate special circumstances to rebut the presumption); In re Walker, 
No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL 1314125, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006) (“In cases 
in which the presumption of abuse does not arise or is rebutted, the U.S. Trustee may pursue 
dismissal of a debtor’s case under section 707(b)(3).”). 
45 In re Haar, 373 B.R. at 495; In re Perrotta, 390 B.R. 26, 31 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008); In 
re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 545 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012) (noting that a mechanical application 
of the means test is consistent with Congress’s intent to limit the bankruptcy court’s 
discretion and that the certainty of this approach over an “actual circumstances evaluation” 
in chapter 7 cases complements the totality of circumstances inquiry prescribed by section 
707(b)(2)(B) which remains the backup option when the trustee is dissatisfied with the 
results of the means test); In re Perelman, 419 B.R. 168, 173 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009); see 
generally Ned W. Waxman & Justin H. Rucki, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Abuse: Means 
Testing is Presumptive, but ‘Totality’ is Determinative, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 905 (2008) 
(recognizing that the proper role of the means test in chapter 7 is simply as a mechanism 
for generating a presumption; it does not result in any final determination). 
46 See In re Rivers, 466 B.R. at 563; In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 316-18 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2007); In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 905, 911 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009). 
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the debtor passes the means test or where the presumption of abuse is not 
triggered.47 
In sharp contrast to the means test’s function as a bright line test of 
eligibility in chapter 7 cases, in chapter 13 bankruptcy cases the 
calculation must allow the bankruptcy court to accurately determine, 
rather than merely approximate, the amount of debtor’s post-petition 
disposable income that can feasibly be paid to unsecured creditors over the 
life of the Chapter 13 Plan.48 Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code enables 
an individual debtor to obtain a discharge of their debts if the debtor pays 
his creditors a portion of his monthly income in accordance with a court-
approved debt repayment plan that lasts three to five years post-petition.49 
As a rule, the funding for creditor repayment is based on the debtor’s 
anticipated future earnings.50 To determine how much of his future 
earnings the debtor must commit to paying unsecured creditors under the 
plan, section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code borrows the chapter 7 means 
test statutory formula.51 In chapter 13 cases, however, the mathematical 
calculation of CMI minus allowable expenses is used to yield the debtor’s 
“projected disposable income,” or the amount that an above-median debtor 
must devote to reimbursing creditors under the plan.52 Although the 
Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “projected disposable income,” 
it defines “disposable income” as “current monthly income received by 
the debtor . . . less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” for the 
debtor’s maintenance or support.53 For above-median debtors the 
“amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” for debtor’s maintenance 
                                                                                                             
47 See In re Rivers, 466 B.R. at 563; In re Perelman, 419 B.R. at 173; In re Perrotta, 390 
B.R. at 31; In re Hartwick, 359 B.R. 16, 21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007). 
48 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)-(3) (West 2018); see generally In re Johnson, 503 B.R. 
447, 450 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013) (“[t]here is a significant difference between chapter 13, 
where the goal is to pay creditors out of projected disposable income, and chapter 7, where 
the goal is liquidation and discharge and the court is not required to project debtor’s future 
resources.”). 
49 See 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (2018) et seq.; section 1306 (2018); Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 
U.S. at 508-09 (“Unlike debtors who file for chapter 7 and must liquidate their nonexempt 
assets in order to pay creditors, Chapter 13 debtors are permitted to keep their property, but 
they must agree to a court-approved plan under which they pay creditors out of future 
income . . . .”). 
50 11 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1)-(3); Richard S. Stolker, The Means Test in Chapter 13 After 
Hamilton v. Lanning and Johnson v. Zimmer, MD. B.J., January/February 12, 2013. 
51 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)-(3). 
52 In a chapter 13 case, if the trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to the confirmation 
of the debt repayment plan, the debtor must commit of all debtor’s “projected disposable 
income” to paying unsecured creditors over the life of the plan. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(b)(1)(B)(2)(2016). The term “projected disposable income” is undefined in the 
Code § 1325(b)(1)(B)-(3); see also Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 509. 
53 § 1325(b)(3). 
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and support is calculated by using the means test calculation.54 Notably, 
section 1325 borrows only the means test calculation itself and does not 
incorporate into chapter 13 either of the alternative abuse tests in section 
707(b)(3) which, in chapter 7 cases, allow the bankruptcy court to consider 
post-petition fluctuations in income and expenses that impact debtor’s 
repayment capacity.55 
 Often referred to as a “living chapter,” bankruptcy courts have 
recognized that a Chapter 13 debtor’s circumstances are constantly 
changing and evolving such that, throughout the life of a Chapter 13 Plan, 
it is often amended to reflect post-petition changes in the debtor’s financial 
circumstances.56 Because a Chapter 13 Plan requires that creditors be 
repaid using debtor’s actual future earnings, rather than some approximate 
estimation based on debtor’s pre-petition historical income, the United 
States Supreme Court has held that a forward-looking approach is 
appropriate in some cases for the purpose of determining debtor’s 
“projected disposable income.”57 This approach, as described by the Court 
in the Lanning and Ransom cases, makes sense given that, in chapter 13 
bankruptcy cases, section 707(b)(3) does not apply and, therefore, cannot 
function to allow a bankruptcy court to consider how post-petition 
fluctuations in debtor’s income or expenses will affect his repayment 
capacity.58 Accordingly, in those cases, post-petition changes to debtor’s 
finances can only be considered or accounted for by modifying the amount 
of debtor’s disposable income, so as to reflect the changes, or by 
modifying the Chapter 13 Plan itself after its confirmation. Even in chapter 
13 cases, however, the Court has emphasized that the mechanical approach 
is the proper starting point for determining disposable income using the 
means test calculation.59 Only when there are changes to debtor’s income 
                                                                                                             
54 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv); see also Ransom, 562 U.S. at 65 (noting that this 
test supplanted the pre-BAPCPA practice of calculating debtors’ reasonable expenses on a 
case-by-case basis, which led to varying and often inconsistent determinations). 
55 See § 1325(b)(3). 
56 In re Ralston, 400 B.R. 854, 859 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009). 
57 Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. at 509 (stating that, in calculating a debtor’s “projected 
disposable income” in a chapter 13 case a forward-looking approach must apply). 
58 Section 1325 incorporates by reference only subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 
707(b)(2)’s means test and excludes any mention of section 707(b)(3)’s alternative abuse 
tests–the bad faith and totality of circumstances tests which allow a trustee to seek 
dismissal of the case for abuse based on post-petition changes to debtor’s ability to pay. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (“Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph 
(2) . . . shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 
707(b)(2) . . . .”). 
59 See Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 519 (“[A] court taking the forward-looking approach should 
begin by calculating disposable income, and in most cases, nothing more is required. It is 
only in unusual cases that a court must go further and take into account other known or 
virtually certain information about the debtor’s future income or expenses.”). 
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or expenses that are known or virtually certain to occur at the time of 
confirmation, should a dynamic or forward-looking approach be used.60 
The United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Hamilton v. Lanning 
and Ransom v. FIA Card Services interpret section 1325 of the Bankruptcy 
Code and the function of the means test calculation for purposes of 
determining the amount of payments to be made to unsecured creditors 
during the life of a Chapter 13 Plan. In both of these cases, the Court 
recognizes that the nature of a chapter 13 case, and its attendant repayment 
to creditors through an ongoing plan of debt repayment, militate against a 
strictly mechanical approach to determine disposable income and may 
require bankruptcy courts to consider future changes to the debtor’s 
income or expenses. 61 In neither case, however, does the Court state, or 
even allude, that a forward-looking means test is appropriate in chapter 7 
cases. 
B. Hamilton v. Lanning: Modifying the Means Test to Accurately 
Determine Debtor’s Actual Repayment Capacity in Chapter 13 
Cases 
In Hamilton v. Lanning, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to specifically decide how a bankruptcy court should calculate a 
debtor’s “projected disposable income” in a chapter 13 case.62 The 
Hamilton case presented the unique scenario of an individual debtor whose 
“current monthly income” was inflated by a non-recurring payment 
received by the debtor shortly before the bankruptcy filing.63 As a result 
of that payment, the Debtor’s CMI did not accurately reflect debtor’s 
actual post-petition earnings, the earnings that would be available to pay 
creditors under the Chapter 13 Plan, which were significantly lower.64 The 
debtor’s “current monthly income” was calculated as $5,343.70, well 
above the state-median, and her monthly disposable income was 
$1,114.98.65 In reality, since filing her bankruptcy petition, the debtor had 
started a new job giving her monthly income totaling $1,922, an amount 
below the state-median, and a monthly disposable income amount of 
                                                                                                             
60 Id. 
61 See id. at 520 (“In cases in which a debtor’s disposable income during the 6-month 
look-back period is either substantially lower or higher than the debtor’s disposable income 
during the plan period, the mechanical approach would produce senseless results . . . .”). 
62 Id. at 509 (recognizing that, in determining whether to confirm a Chapter 13 Plan, 
some lower courts had taken a “mechanical approach” while some had adopted a forward-
looking approach). 
63 Id. at 511. 
64 Id. 
65 Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 511. 
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$149.03.66 Accordingly, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 Plan that committed 
$144 per month of debtor’s disposable income to paying unsecured 
creditors.67 
The Chapter 13 trustee objected to the confirmation of the plan 
arguing that the debtor had not committed all of her projected disposable 
income to the repayment of creditors.68 According to the trustee, the proper 
way to calculate projected disposable income was to use a mechanical 
approach and multiply the debtor’s disposable income, as calculated on 
Form 22C using the means test calculation, by the number of months in 
the Plan commitment period.69 Using that approach, the trustee argued, the 
debtor would be able to pay the unsecured creditors in full by making 
monthly plan payments of $756 for five years, the applicable commitment 
period for above-median debtors.70 Given the inaccurate inflation of 
debtor’s CMI due to the one-time pre-petition payment, however, the 
parties agreed that the debtor’s actual monthly disposable income of 
merely $149.03, was insufficient to pay that amount.71 
Stating that the statutory text of section 1325 was in itself inconsistent 
and contrary to the application of a strictly mechanical approach when 
determining the amount of projected disposable income to be paid to 
creditors over the life of a Chapter 13 Plan, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a bankruptcy court may consider post-petition changes to 
the debtor’s finances, such as a decrease or increase to debtor’s post-
petition income or expenses, when calculating “projected disposable 
income” in chapter 13 cases.72 The Court stated: “[W]e hold that when a 
bankruptcy court calculates a debtor’s projected disposable income, the 
court may account for changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are 
known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation.”73 In so holding, the 
Court relied heavily on the statutory text of section 1325 stating, first, that 
in section 1325(b)(1)(B) the “reference to projected disposable income ‘to 
be received in the applicable commitment period’ strongly favor[ed] [a] 
forward looking approach.”74 A Chapter 13 Plan’s applicable commitment 
period is necessarily forward-looking as plan payments are made by a 






71 Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 511. 
72 Id. at 517 (“The mechanical approach [] clashes repeatedly with the terms of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325.”). 
73 Id. at 524. 
74 Id. at 517 (quoting section 1325(b)(1)(B)). 
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debtor for three to five years post-petition.75 Moreover, the Court noted 
that the mandate in section 1325(b)(1) that courts determine projected 
disposable income “as of the effective date of the plan” similarly calls for 
a forward looking approach to be applied in chapter 13 cases as the 
“effective date of the plan” is the date on which a plan is confirmed and 
becomes binding.76 The Court noted that, because of the dynamic nature 
of a chapter 13 case, employing a strictly mechanical approach in 
calculating projected disposable income would produce a senseless result 
not intended by Congress. That approach would deny creditors payments 
that the debtor could easily make in cases where debtor’s disposable 
income is higher during plan period than during the six-month lookback 
period while denying Chapter 13 protection to debtors, such as the debtor 
in Hamilton, where debtor’s disposable income during the plan period is 
substantially lower than debtor’s income pre-petition.77 
C. Ransom v. FIA Card Services: A More Realistic Measure of 
Debtor’s Actual Expenses in Chapter 13 Cases 
After its decision in Hamilton, the United States Supreme Court once 
again had opportunity to interpret section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code in 
the case of Ransom v. FIA Card Services.78 In Ransom, the Court 
considered whether a chapter 13 debtor could deduct from debtor’s current 
monthly income the amount allowed under the Local Standards for vehicle 
ownership costs even when the debtor was not making loan or lease 
payments on his vehicle.79 Specifically, the question before the Court was 
how a bankruptcy court should calculate the expense for vehicle 
ownership costs, when determining the amount a debtor could deduct from 
                                                                                                             
75 The “applicable commitment period” for a Chapter 13 Plan is defined in section 
1325(b)(4) as three years for below-median debtors or not less than five years if the 
debtor’s income is above the median income for a family of similar size. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(b)(4)(A)-(B). 
76 Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 518 (quoting sections 1325(b)(1); 1327(a)). 
77 Id. at 519 (agreeing with the United States Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit’s 
opinion that “a court taking the forward-looking approach should begin by calculating 
disposable income . . . It is only in unusual cases that a court may go further and take into 
account other known or virtually certain information about the debtor’s future income or 
expenses.”). 
78 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 61. 
79 Id. at 64. The Local Standards allow a debtor with a vehicle to claim an allowance for 
certain costs of car ownership. The Transportation Expense Standards consists of two parts: 
nationwide figures for monthly loan or lease payments, referred to as ownership costs, and 
an additional allowance for monthly operating costs. The Operating Costs include vehicle 
maintenance, fuel, repairs, insurance, fuel, registrations, licenses, inspections, parking and 
tolls. The United States Department of Justice at https://www.justice.gov/ust/means-
testing/20180501 (visited on Oct. 4, 2018). 
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his disposable income for “amounts reasonably necessary to be 
expended.”80 
The debtor proposed to pay creditors approximately 25 percent of his 
unsecured debt over the life of the Chapter 13 Plan.81 FIA Card Services, 
one of debtor’s unsecured creditors, objected claiming that the debtor’s 
plan did not direct all of his projected disposable income to paying 
unsecured claims.82 FIA argued that the debtor should not have claimed 
the car-ownership allowance as an expense because debtor was not making 
loan or lease payments on his car.83 FIA noted that, without this expense, 
debtor’s monthly disposable income would be significantly higher, 
amounting to a difference of approximately $28,000 over the life of the 
plan.84 
The Court held that the debtor could not take the allowance for vehicle 
ownership, finding that a chapter 13 debtor could only claim a deduction 
under the National or Local Standards if the debtor would incur that kind 
of expense during the life of the plan.85 Because Ransom owned his car 
outright, he could not take the deduction for car ownership.86 
The Court focused first on the statutory language of section 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) of the Bankruptcy Code.87 It states: “The debtor’s 
monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable monthly expense 
amounts specified under the National Standards and Local 
Standard . . . .”88 The key word in this phrase according to the Court is 
“applicable” as it was added by Congress to act as a filter separating 
debtors who qualify for an allowance from those debtors that do not.89 An 
expense is “applicable” within the plain meaning of the statute when the 
expense is appropriate or relevant, as is the case when a debtor has costs 
corresponding to that category.90 The Court noted that because, in section 
1325, Congress incorporated the means test into chapter 13 in order to 
approximate an above-median debtor’s reasonable expenditures on 
                                                                                                             
80 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 64 (“This case concerns the specified expense for vehicle 
ownership costs. We must determine whether a debtor . . . who owns a car outright, and so 
does not make loan or lease payments, may claim an allowance for car-ownership costs 
(thereby reducing the amount he will repay creditors).”). 
81 Id. at 67 (noting that Ransom proposed a five-year plan that would have resulted in 




85 Id. at 64. 
86 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 73. 
87 Id. at 65-66. 
88 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(b)(1)(B) and (b)(4). 
89 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 69-70. 
90 Id. 
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essential items, for purposes of determining the amount to be paid to 
unsecured creditors under the plan, a debtor should be required to qualify 
for an expense by incurring an expense in the relevant category.91 
According to the Court: “If Congress had not wanted to separate in this 
way debtors who qualify for an allowance from those that do not, it could 
have omitted the term ‘applicable’ altogether. Without that word, all 
debtors would be eligible to claim a deduction for each category listed in 
the Standards. Congress presumably included ‘applicable’ to achieve a 
different result.”92 
III. THE MEANS TEST AND THE SECURED DEBT EXPENSE: AN 
EXERCISE IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
To determine whether a debtor may deduct the secured debt expense 
on his chapter 7 means test when the debtor intends to surrender the 
collateral, a court must begin by examining the text of section 
707(b)(2)(A)(iii) to arrive at its plain meaning.93 When the statute’s 
language is plain, the sole function of the court–at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd–is to enforce it according to 
its terms.94 The United States Supreme Court has stated that the plainness 
or ambiguity of statutory text is determined by reference to the language 
itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole.95 Where the statutory language is not 
ambiguous, there is generally no need for a court to inquire beyond the 
plain language of the statute.96   
                                                                                                             
91 See id. at 65. The term “projected disposable income” is undefined in the Code, but 
the term “disposable income” is defined as “current monthly income received by the 
debtor . . . less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended[.]” § 1325(b)(1)(B)-(3). For 
above-median debtors the “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” is calculated by 
using the means test. §§ 1325(b)(3); 707(b)(2)(A)-(B); see also Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 509. 
92 Id. at 70. 
93 Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“It 
is well settled that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute 
itself.”); Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); Ransom, 562 U.S. at 
69 (“Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code starts where all such inquiries must begin, with 
the language of the statute itself.”). 
94 Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (stating that the plain meaning of the statute is conclusive 
unless literal application of the statute will produce a result “demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of the drafters”). 
95 Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242. 
96 In re American Steel Product, Inc., 197 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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A. The Secured Debt Expense in Chapter 7 Cases: Plain Meaning 
and Congressional Intent 
Section 707(b)(2)(A) provides that, in considering whether the 
granting of bankruptcy relief would constitute abuse, the court shall 
presume that abuse exists “if the debtor’s current monthly income reduced 
by the amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv)” yields a 
monetary amount that is above the monetary threshold set by the statute.97 
Sub-section (ii) allows a debtor to deduct specific applicable monthly 
expenses under the National and Local Standards.98 Sub-section (iii) 
allows a debtor to deduct from current monthly income “[t]he debtor’s 
average monthly payment on account of secured debts [which] shall be 
calculated as the sum of the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually 
due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date 
of the filing of the petition[.]”.99 
At issue is the phrase “amounts scheduled as contractually due to 
secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date of the 
petition . . . .”100 The question is whether the language in this phrase, when 
considered within the context of the means test as a whole, creates a static 
test: one that allows the deduction when there are amounts due to secured 
creditors on the petition date irrespective of the intended surrender of the 
collateral.101 Or, alternatively, whether it creates a dynamic or forward-
looking test: one that, by looking to the post-petition future, disallows the 
expense when, although contractually bound to make payments to secured 
creditors on the petition date, the debtor surrenders the collateral so that, 
at some point in the future, that collateral may be sold thereby 
extinguishing debtor’s contractual obligation to pay the claim.102 
One of the earliest cases to interpret this statutory provision, In re 
Walker, analyzed the phrase giving each word its plain ordinary 
                                                                                                             
97 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
98 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
99 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) (2012). 
100 Id. 
101 The two most commonly adopted approaches by bankruptcy courts are referred to as 
the “snapshot approach” and the “future oriented” approach. The majority of cases reason 
that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), the secured debt expense, was 
meant to create a snapshot of the debtor’s finances as of the petition date and that the 
bankruptcy court should not consider the debtor’s future intention except under a totality 
of circumstances analysis. A minority of courts have adopted the “future oriented” 
approach which allows debtor to claim only those secured debt expenses which the debtor 
reasonably expects to pay post-petition. In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 905, 910 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2009) (explaining split in authority and compiling authorities). 
102 Id. 
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meaning.103 In Walker, the debtors argued that they could deduct from their 
current monthly income an amount equal to the payments due on their 
primary residence, subject to a first and second mortgage, and one of their 
vehicles, which was subject to a lien.104 The debtors asserted that the 
statute’s plain language allowed them to deduct these payments despite 
their intent to surrender the collateral because, on the petition date, they 
were contractually obligated to make these payments in the sixty months 
following the petition date.105 The United States Trustee contended that 
the debtors should not be allowed to deduct the expense because, given 
their intent to surrender the collateral, they would not actually be making 
those payments post-petition.106 
The court held that both the plain meaning of section 
707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) and the text, structure, and context of the means test 
compelled the conclusion that debtors could deduct the payments, despite 
their intent to surrender the collateral, as they were legally obligated to 
make those payments on the petition date.107 Turning first to the text of the 
statute, the court noted that the word “scheduled” in the phrase “scheduled 
as contractually due to secured creditors,” was commonly defined as “to 
plan for a certain date,”108 while the phrase “as contractually due” referred 
to a debtor’s legal obligation under contract law to make a payment in a 
certain amount.109 The court concluded that the surrender of the collateral, 
whether intended prospectively or already effected, did not change the fact 
that, on the petition date, the payments were “contractually due” nor did it 
                                                                                                             
103 In re Walker, No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL 1314125, at *3-4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 
1, 2006); see also In re Randle, No. 07C631, 2007 WL 2668727, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 
2007) (“The United States Supreme Court and our United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit have consistently instructed us lower courts to accord statutory terms or 
words their ordinary, common meaning unless they are specifically defined by the statute 
or statutory context requires a different definition.”); In re Ralston, 400 B.R. 854, 860 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (stating that “[w]here the words in the statute are not defined 
terms, the court should look to their ordinary, dictionary-defined meaning.”). 
104 In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, at *1. 
105 Id. at *2. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at *4–6. 
108 Id. at *3 (quoting Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1713 (2d ed. rev. 
2001)). 
109 In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, at *3 (“The common meaning of ‘as contractually 
due’ is that the debtor is legally obligated under the contract, in this case, a promissory 
note, to make a payment in a certain amount, with a certain amount of interest, for a set 
number of months into the future. Accordingly, payments that are ‘scheduled as 
contractually due’ are those payments that the debtor will be required to make on certain 
dates in the future under the contract.”); In re Randle, No. 07C631, 2007 WL 2668727, at 
*5 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2007). 
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eliminate the debtors’ contractual liability for the debt.110 Rejecting the 
Trustee’s argument that this interpretation would give debtors a “free 
pass” not intended by Congress by allowing the debtor to deduct the 
expense without the attendant burden of having to make those payments 
post-petition, the court stated: “[W]hether debtor passes or fails the means 
test is relevant only to the question of whether the U.S. Trustee will benefit 
from the presumption of abuse. In cases in which the presumption of abuse 
does not arise or is rebutted, the U.S. Trustee may pursue dismissal of a 
debtor’s case under section 707(b)(3), which provides that the court may 
consider whether the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of the debtor’s 
financial situation demonstrates abuse.”111 
Similarly, in In re Ralston, the court undertook a step by step analysis 
to arrive at the plain meaning of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I).112 Referring 
to the dictionary definition of the word “schedule” or “scheduled,” the 
court stated that the word means “to place or include in a schedule[,] to 
make a schedule of [or] to plan for a certain time, while the word 
“contractual” or “contractually” means “of or having the nature of 
contract.”113 Together, the phrase “scheduled as contractually due” refers 
to the “planned” payments that are scheduled to be due pursuant to 
contract.114 The court noted that, in the statute, this language is followed 
by the phrase “in each of the 60 months following the date of the petition.” 
The court held that this phrase along with the subsequent language in the 
statute “divided by 60” provided the court with guidance on how to 
calculate the amount that debtor could deduct on the means test calculation 
and did not call for a forward-looking analysis of the expense: “Taken 
together, the meaning behind these provisions is . . . that the debtor will 
only be allowed to deduct monthly an amount equal to the total of such 
                                                                                                             
110 In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, at *4 (“When a debtor files the bankruptcy petition, 
the debtor is contractually due for payments on the outstanding secured debts for the length 
of the contract. The debtor’s contractual liability for the debt is not eliminated upon the 
surrender of the collateral.”); see also In re Nockerts, 357 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 
2006) (noting that “nothing the debtor does or does not do changes the fact that scheduled 
payments remain contractually due”); In re Randle, 2007 WL 2668727, at *7 (“The 
debtor’s announced intent to surrender the property does not change the contractual 
obligation owed by the debtor.”). 
111 In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, at *8. 
112 In re Ralston, 400 B.R. 854, 862 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009). 
113 Id. at 862 (quoting Webster’s New College Dictionary 1281(Michael Agnes ed. 
2007)); see also United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2003) ([T]o 
determine the common usage or ordinary meaning of a term, courts often turn to dictionary 
definitions for guidance.”). 
114 In re Ralston, 400 B.R. at 862-63; In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2012) (“Since a determination of the appropriate proceeding should be made as of the 
petition date, a debtor’s deductions from income on the means test should also be 
determined as of the petition date.”). 
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payments on secured debt due during the 60 months following the date of 
the petition, divided by sixty.115 According to the court, the plain meaning 
of the statute calls for a snapshot of the debtor’s contractual secured debt 
obligations on the date of the petition.116 Like the court in In re Walker, 
the court in Ralston held that the debtor could take the expense when 
payment is contractually due on the petition date and emphasized that, 
while debtor’s contractual obligation may be extinguished at some point 
in the process, it is not extinguished upon the filing of the Statement of 
Intention.117 Because having an intent to surrender the property does not 
have any legal effect on the nature of the debt, in order to take into account 
the subsequent surrender of the collateral, the court would have to take 
post-petition events into consideration.118 This, according to the court, is 
incompatible with the nature of the means test in chapter 7 cases.119 
After the decision of the court in In re Walker, the majority of courts 
considering the issue have held that the language of the statute is clear, not 
ambiguous, and that the plain meaning of the statutory text allows a debtor 
to take a deduction for payments due to secured creditors on the petition 
date despite indicating an intent to surrender the collateral on debtor’s 
statement of intention.120 Moreover, a contextual analysis of section 
707(b) that includes the additional abuse tests of section 707(b)(3), proves 
that means testing in chapter 7 cases is incompatible with any 
interpretation of the statute that selects a singular expense within the 
                                                                                                             
115 In re Ralston, 400 B.R. at 862. The Ralston court provides the following example to 
illustrate: “[I]f the debtor has a monthly secured debt payment of $600, but only 10 
payments [contractually due on the petition date], the allowed deduction will be the total 
of those payments, or $6,000, divided by 60. Thus, the debtor would only be allowed $100 
monthly deduction on account of secured debt under this provision, despite the fact that 
the actual monthly payment is $600.” Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 863. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. (“The Means Test, as a whole, as it is applied in a Chapter 7 case, has the character 
of a mechanical formula that often relates very little to the actual financial circumstances 
of the debtor.”). 
120 See In re Navin, 526 B.R. 81 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015); In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 562 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012); In re Hardigan, No. 12-40484, 2012 WL 9703097 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ga. Dec. 20, 2012); In re Grinkmeyer, 456 B.R. 385 (Bankr. S.D. Id. 2011); In re Sonntag, 
No. 10-1749, 2011 WL 3902999 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Sept. 6, 2011); In re Ng, No. 10-
02001, 2011 WL 576067 (Bankr. D. Ha. Feb. 9, 2011); In re Perelman, 419 B.R. 168, 173 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (recognizing the split of authority and stating that the “vast 
majority of courts to consider this issue have concluded that the plain language of the 
statute permits a chapter 7 debtor to deduct payments on secured debt even when the debtor 
plans to surrender post-petition the collateral underlying the debt”); In re Haar, 360 B.R. 
759, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that a debtor who surrenders secured property 
is permitted to expense payments on that property when conducting the means test 
calculation of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)). 
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means test calculation for special forward-looking treatment–particularly 
when there is no language in the statute that limits the availability of that 
expense to debtors.121 
B. A Mechanical Means Test Acquires a Forward-Looking  
Element: The Trend Cases 
It is well established that, in determining whether a chapter 7 case is 
an abuse of the bankruptcy laws, post-petition changes to the debtor’s 
income or expenses, including a reduction to debtor’s expenses resulting 
from the surrender of collateral, must be considered using a totality of the 
circumstances analysis pursuant to section 707(b)(3).122 In In re Denzin, 
the bankruptcy court recognized that the chapter 7 means test is not 
forward-looking and emphasized that Congress included “complementary 
dynamic chapter 7 abuse test[s],” the section 707(b)(3) bad faith and 
totality of the circumstances tests, that support the chapter 7 means test 
and allow the court to look at debtor’s actual financial affairs and 
surrounding circumstances.123 The court stated: “Together, they provide a 
straight-forward, bright-line test, [section] 707(b)(2), supported by a 
dynamic, customized test, [section] 707(b)(3). The first looks to a debtor’s 
hypothetical budget; the second emphasizes the debtor’s actual budget. 
Between the two of them, a debtor who should not be in chapter 7 should 
be identified and redirected to chapter 13.”124 
Notwithstanding, cases interpreting section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) post 
Lanning and Ransom, or the “trend cases,” have increasingly denied 
chapter 7 debtors the ability to deduct secured debt payments on the means 
test when the debtor has indicated an intent to surrender the collateral post-
                                                                                                             
121 See In re Rivers, 466 B.R. at 567-70; In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 465 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 2006); In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 316-18 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); In re Brady, 419 
B.R. 479, 486 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009); In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 905 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2009). 
122 In re Denzin, 534 B.R. 883, 887 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015) (“There is no language in 
§ 707(b) that is forward-looking as there is in § 1325(b).”); In re Haman, 368 B.R. at 316-
18 (calculations under the means test are purposefully circumscribed and should not 
include foreseeable circumstances; instead, such future circumstances are properly 
considered under the totality analysis of section 707(b)(3)); In re Hartwick, 359 B.R. 16, 
22 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (finding that the “consideration of postpetition developments in 
the application of the means test would be contrary to Congressional intent as expressed in 
the amendments to § 707(b)”); In re Singletary, 354 B.R. at 465 (“To allow a movant to 
include the outcome of future events as part of the means test would eliminate the 
distinction between the presumption of abuse test and the totality of the circumstances 
test.”). 
123 In re Denzin, 543 B.R. at 887. 
124 Id. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 203 
 
petition.125 Most bankruptcy courts that disallow the expense usually do 
so relying on dicta from Hamilton or Ransom that is taken out of context 
and not directly relevant to the interpretation of the statutory language of 
section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).126 Instead, that dicta is relevant to the 
interpretation of section 1325 of the Code and the manner in which the 
bankruptcy court should arrive at a determination of a chapter 13 debtor’s 
projected disposable income.127 Some use that language to impute 
restrictions on the availability of the expense when the statute itself 
contains no such limitations.128 Other courts deny the expense deduction 
based simply on the overarching congressional purpose underlying 
BAPCPA of making debtors repay creditors the maximum they can 
                                                                                                             
125 See In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207, 212 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015); see also In re Hamilton, 
513 B.R. 292 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2014); In re White, 512 B.R. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 
2014); In re Clary, No. 6:11-bk-04556-ABB, 2012 WL 868717 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 
2012); In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 
540 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); In re Krawczyk, No. 11-09596-8-JRL, 2012 WL 3069437 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 27, 2012); In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 872 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); 
In re Wilson, 454 B.R. 155 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011). 
126 See In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880-81; In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. at 135 (noting 
that, when taken together, the most recent line of cases including Ransom and Lanning 
“depart[] from the strict formulaic approach to the means test and take into account what 
is likely to occur in the future”); In re Fredman, 471 B.R. at 550; In re Krawczyk, 2012 
WL 3069437, at *4; In re Hamilton, 513 B.R. at 297-303. But see In re Hardigan, No. 12-
40484, 2012 WL 9703097, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2012) (stating that the holdings 
in Lanning and Ransom did not overrule precedent that allowed debtors to deduct secured 
debt expense despite surrender of collateral in chapter 7 case). 
127 In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 564 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“Clearly, Lanning and 
Ransom both arise in the context of Chapter 13 cases, and both involve a determination of 
projected disposable income and the question of how much the debtors were required to 
submit to their Chapter 13 Plans for payment to creditors.”); In re Grinkmeyer, 456 B.R. 
385, 387-89 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2011) (finding that Lanning and Ransom are applicable to 
chapter 13’s concept of projected disposable income, which does not exist in chapter 7, 
and holding that a chapter 7 debtor may deduct mortgage payments on property he plans 
to surrender); In re Johnson, 503 B.R. 447, 450 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013) (“[T]here is a 
significant difference between chapter 13, where the goal is to pay creditors out of 
projected disposable income, and chapter 7, where the goal is liquidation and discharge 
and the court is not required to project debtor’s future resources.”). 
128 See In re White, 512 B.R. at 829 (“In order to deduct payments on secured debt . . . a 
debtor must intend to actually make the payments going forward . . . .”); In re Fredman, 
471 B.R. at 550–51 (requiring that debtor show a secured payment arising out of a 
contractual relationship that is due and being paid post-petition); In re Krawczyk, 2012 
WL 3069437, at *5 (stating that “despite the language of the statute, courts are to look at 
what is actually happening in these transactions and calculate deductions based on the 
debtor’s actual expenses”); In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880 (stating that “‘a debtor should 
be required to qualify for a deduction by actually incurring an expense in the relevant 
category’”) (quoting Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 725). 
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afford.129 Finally, some bankruptcy courts mistakenly assume that an 
indication by the debtor that collateral will be surrendered, or the post-
petition surrender of collateral itself, has the effect of extinguishing the 
underlying obligation thereby making the expense inapplicable to the 
debtor.130 As a general rule, therefore, these courts refuse chapter 7 debtors 
the ability to claim the secured debt expense by comparing two very 
different sections of the bankruptcy code, section 707(b)(2) and section 
1325, and treating those sections as if they were wholly interchangeable–
essentially comparing apples and oranges. 
These interpretations of the secured debt expense statute are not only 
strained, but unnecessary given that, in chapter 7 bankruptcy cases, 
Congress has already provided a mechanism that allows for the court to 
consider actual or probable post-petition changes to debtor’s finances–the 
section 707(b)(3) totality of circumstances analysis.131 
In one of the first cases to address the issue after Lanning and Ransom, 
the bankruptcy court in In re Thompson denied the debtors, a husband and 
wife, the ability to deduct from their means test calculation mortgage 
payments due on their primary residence. 132 The debtors had surrendered 
the home, but deducted an amount equal to the average of the mortgage 
payments due on the home for the sixty months following the petition 
date.133 The trustee sought to dismiss the debtors’ chapter 7 case on the 
grounds of presumed abuse, under section 707(b)(1) and, alternatively, 
pursuant to section 707(b)(3).134 The bankruptcy court agreed with the 
trustee and dismissed the debtors’ case for presumed abuse holding that 
                                                                                                             
129 In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207, 212-13 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015) (quoting Ransom, 562 
U.S. at 71); see In re Hamilton, 513 B.R. 292 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2014); In re White, 512 
B.R. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014); In re Clary, No. 6:11-bk-04556-ABB, 2012 WL 
868717 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2012); In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); In re Krawczyk, 
2012 WL 3069437; In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 872 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Wilson, 
454 B.R. 155 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011). 
130 See In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207, 212 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015); In re Thompson, 457 
B.R. 872 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011). 
131 In re Hartwick, 359 B.R. 16, 21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (“Congress did not remove the 
ability of bankruptcy courts to consider circumstances, including postpetition [sic] 
developments, in determining abuse . . . Congress expressly incorporated the formerly 
judicially created totality of the circumstances test which permits consideration of 
circumstances both preceding and following the filing of the petition.”); see also In re 
Perrotta, 390 B.R. 26, 30-31 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008). 
132 See In re Thompson, 457 B.R.at 877, 880. 
133 The debtors argued that they were entitled to list the payments on loans secured by 
the residence because those payments were contractually due to secured creditors in each 
of the 60 months following the date of the bankruptcy petition notwithstanding the 
surrender of the property. The debtors conceded that, without the deductions for the 
mortgage payments, the presumption of abuse arose. Id. at 875, 876-77. 
134 Id. at 874-75. 
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the debtors could not deduct from the means test calculation any secured 
debt payments owed on the residence that the debtors had surrendered.135 
Without focusing on the statutory language of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), 
the bankruptcy court in Thompson held that debtors could not deduct the 
mortgage expense because these were not “actually-incurred expenses” 
given that the property had been surrendered and debtors would not be 
making payments on that loan post-petition.136 The court reasoned that 
debtors had to “qualify” for the expense by actually incurring it in order to 
deduct the secured debt payment from the means test.137 To support its 
reasoning, the court in Thompson directly quotes Ransom stating: 
“Because Congress intended the means test to approximate the debtor’s 
reasonable expenditures on essential items, a debtor should be required to 
qualify for a deduction by actually incurring an expense in the relevant 
category.”138 The court in Thompson fails to recognize, however, that 
Congress intended the means test to approximate the debtor’s reasonable 
expenditures in chapter 13 cases where it specifically made the means test 
calculation the mechanism for determining the reasonable expenditures for 
above-median debtors.139 That statutory language, present in section 1325, 
is notably absent from section 707(b) and not relevant to the means test 
calculation as it functions in chapter 7 cases.140 Even assuming that 
Congress did indeed intend the expenses in section 707(b) to approximate 
reasonable expenses for chapter 7 debtors as well, the court’s 
interpretation of the secured debt expense statute in Thompson is 
misguided. Unlike in Ransom, where the expense statute at issue allowed 
the debtor to claim only the “debtor’s applicable monthly expense 
amounts under . . . the National Standards and Local Standards . . . “ 
(emphasis added),141 the expense statute before the court in Thompson, the 
secured debt expense, has no such limitation in the statutory text as section 
707(b)(2)(A)(iii) does not require the expense to be “applicable” or 
“actually-incurred” to entitle debtor to claim it.142 
In In re Fredman, the bankruptcy court held that debtors could not 
deduct from their means test calculation mortgage payments for a home 
that the debtors indicated on their statement of intention would be 
surrendered.143 Dismissing the debtor’s chapter 7 case for presumed abuse 
                                                                                                             
135 Id. at 877, 880-81. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 880 (quoting Ransom, 562 U.S. at70-71). 
138 In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880 (quoting Ransom, 562 U.S. at 70-71). 
139 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325; see also infra Part II(B)-(C). 
140 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1325; § 707(b). 
141 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 65–66. 
142 In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 879–80. 
143 In re Fredman, 471 B.R. at 555. 
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the court stated that the debtors could not deduct “phantom” secured debt 
payments from their means test calculation when debtors would not 
actually be making those payments post-petition.144 Relying on the Court’s 
language in Hamilton v. Lanning the court stated: “[I]f a debtor’s decision 
to surrender secured property is ‘known or virtually certain,’ that 
information should be taken into account.”145 In so holding, however, the 
court did not consider nor address why such post-petition changes to 
debtor’s expenses would not be considered pursuant to section 707(b)(3)’s 
totality of the circumstances analysis. 
Similarly, in In re Krawezyk, debtors were not allowed to take the 
secured debt expense for properties they owned that were subject to 
mortgages.146 In finding that the means test calculation triggered a 
presumption of abuse in the debtor’s chapter 7 case the bankruptcy court 
stated: “[D]espite the language of the statute, courts are to look at what is 
actually happening in these transactions and calculate deductions based on 
the debtor’s actual expenses.”147 The court noted that the most recent line 
of cases, referring to the Court’s opinion in Lanning and Ransom, 
prohibited a debtor from deducting “phantom expenses to shelter 
income.”148 The court failed to acknowledge or attempt to reconcile its 
holding or its rationale with the fact that the majority of expenses deducted 
from CMI on the means test do not reflect the debtor’s “actual expenses” 
or the reality of debtor’s finances. 
The bankruptcy courts’ analysis of the secured debt expense in these 
cases, and other trend cases following this logic, is seriously flawed for 
several reasons. First, although the United States Supreme Court has stated 
that the first point of focus when construing a statute must be the statutory 
language, the courts’ opinions in these cases show that little attention is 
given to the statutory language when interpreting the secured debt expense 
statute.149 In Thompson, for example, the court appears to initially focus 
                                                                                                             
144 Id. (stating that “[w]here there is no actual cost reflected on the bankruptcy schedules, 
since the debtor is surrendering the property and not paying the debt, that fact must be 
recognized and the phantom payment excluded from the calculation of ‘average monthly 
payments on account of secured debts.’”). 
145 Id. at 551. 
146 In re Krawczyk, No. 11-09596-8-JRL, 2012 WL 3069437 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 27, 
2012); 
147 Id. at *5. 
148 Id. 
149 See, e.g., In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207, 212 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015); In re Hamilton, 
513 B.R. 292 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2014); In re White, 512 B.R. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 
2014); In re Clary, No. 6:11-bk-04556-ABB, 2012 WL 868717 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012); 
In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012); In re Fredman, 472 B.R. 540 
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); In re Krawczyk, 2012 WL 3069437; In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 
872 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Wilson, 454 B.R. 155 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011). 
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on construing the language of the statute but, in reality, concentrates on 
the phrase “actually-incurred expense,” a term that does not appear 
anywhere in the text of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).150 As a result, the 
bankruptcy court denies the debtors the ability to deduct the mortgage 
payments from their chapter 7 means test based on a phrase borrowed from 
the Court’s opinion in Ransom, a case where the United States Supreme 
Court interprets a different expense statute and one that is wholly 
irrelevant to the applicability of the secured debt expense in section 
707(b)(2)(A)(iii).151 Notably, the court in Thompson does not cite 
authority, binding or otherwise, to support its reliance on the phrase 
“actually-incurred expense.”152 Presumably, as the court cites the Ransom 
case later in its opinion, the court relies on the language from Ransom 
where the Court interprets section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), a different expense 
statute that allows the debtor to deduct “debtor’s applicable monthly 
expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local 
Standards” (emphasis added).153 In interpreting that language, the Court in 
Ransom holds that to be considered an “applicable monthly expense,” 
debtor must qualify for that deduction by “actually incurring an expense 
in the relevant category.”154 However, in imputing that requirement into 
its interpretation of the secured debt expense, the court in Thompson fails 
to recognize or explain that the statutory text of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) 
does not contain the word “applicable” nor the phrase “actually-incurred 
expense.”155 Several cases decided after Thompson have followed its lead 
denying chapter 7 debtors the ability to claim the secured debt expense and 
citing the case as support for its own analysis requiring that debtor actually 
incurs the secured debt payment post-petition to qualify for the expense.156 
                                                                                                             
150 In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 877 (stating that “The payments on loans secured by 
the . . . [p]roperty are not actually incurred expenses and do not meet the statutory 
definition of ‘payments on account of secured debts.’”). 
151 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 65-66 (basing the interpretation of § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) on the 
presence of the phrase “debtor’s applicable monthly expenses”). 
152 In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880. 
153 See infra Part II. 
154 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 65-66; see also In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880. 
155 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii); see In re Navin, 526 B.R. 81, 85 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
2015) (highlighting the distinction in language between § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii)); In re 
Perelman, 419 B.R. 168, 173 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“There is no conditional language 
in section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) that requires that a debtor must intend to continue to pay the 
contractually due amounts in order to claim the expense.”). 
156 See In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207, 212-13, 215 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015); see also In re 
Hamilton, 513 B.R. 292 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2014); see also In re White, 512 B.R. 822 
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014); see also In re Clary, No. 6:11-bk-04556-ABB, 2012 WL 868717 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2012); see also In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. 2012); see also In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2012); see also In 
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A second flaw in these trend cases is that the bankruptcy courts do not 
account for the fact that, where Congress intended that the court consider 
the debtor’s “actual monthly expenses” in the means test it expressly stated 
so in the statute.157 A cardinal principle of statutory construction is that 
Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it 
says.”158 In section 707(b) of the bankruptcy code, Congress uses the 
phrase “actual monthly expenses” or “actual expenses” five times; 
thereby, directing a debtor to deduct from his CMI only the actual amount 
spent on specific items or services.159 For example, in subsection 
(2)(A)(ii)(I), the debtor is directed to deduct his “actual monthly expenses 
for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses.”160 In subsection 
(II), Congress directs a debtor to claim “the continuation of actual 
expenses paid by the debtor that are reasonable and necessary for the 
support of an elderly, chronically ill, or disabled household 
member . . . .”161 Notably, the phrase “actual expenses” is used in 
subsections (I), (II), (III), (IV), and (V) of section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii); yet, 
the phrase is markedly absent from the very next subsection, subsection 
(iii), the portion of the statute that provides for the deduction of secured 
debt payments.162 There is no conditional language in section 
707(b)(2)(A)(iii) that requires that a debtor must intend to continue to pay 
the contractually due amounts in order to claim the expense.163 
Moreover, where Congress intended to limit the deduction of those 
expenses to only those that are “reasonable” or “necessary,” it again 
expressly incorporated that limitation into the statutory language.164 The 
text of the secured debt expense statute, section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the 
bankruptcy code, is close in proximity to each of these statutory 
provisions. Notably, however, the terms “actual monthly expense,” “actual 
expense,” and “reasonably necessary” are absent from the language of that 
statute.165 This shows that had Congress wanted to limit the applicability 
of the secured debt expense to only those debtors that would actually be 
making payments on the secured debt post-petition, it could have easily 
                                                                                                             
re Krawczyk, No. 11-09596-8-JRL, 2012 WL 3069437 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 27, 2012); 
see also In re Wilson, 454 B.R. 155 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011). 
157 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), (II), (III), (IV), (V). 
158 Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992). 
159 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), (II), (III), (IV), (V). 
160 The bankruptcy code states that “Other Necessary Expenses” includes “reasonably 
necessary health insurance, disability insurance, and health savings expenses for the debtor, 
the spouse of the debtor, or the dependents of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
161 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(2016). 
162 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(2016). 
163 In re Perelman, 419 B.R. 168, 174 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
164 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2016). 
165 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(2016). 
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and clearly stated that requirement in the text of the statute. Congress 
chose not to limit the applicability of the secured debt expense statute in 
this manner; accordingly, bankruptcy courts should not impute such 
limitations in an attempt to fix a perceived error in the means test or to 
better achieve some congressional purpose.166 
Finally, when one considers the broader context within which the 
secured debt expense statute exists in section 707(b), it becomes clear that 
bankruptcy courts’ reliance on the dicta of both Hamilton v. Lanning and 
Ransom v. FIA Card Services is misplaced in chapter 7 cases. A concern 
that features prominently in most of the trend cases, and that could be 
called the driving force behind the courts’ decisions to deny chapter 7 
debtors the benefit of the expense, is the apprehension that allowing the 
deduction would frustrate the legislative intent underlying the BAPCPA 
amendments and means testing generally; the Congressional dictate that 
debtors should be forced to pay creditors the maximum they can afford.167 
In short, bankruptcy courts are concerned that allowing the debtor to 
deduct secured debt payments that debtor will not in reality be making 
post-petition essentially permits him to pull one over on his creditors by 
enabling debtor to bypass the means test without being caught for abuse.168 
In Fredman, for example, the court noted that allowing debtors to deduct 
fictitious monthly payments would be senseless and contrary to the intent 
of Congress.169 Other courts have referred to this type of expense as 
“phantom expenses” and have stated that allowing a debtor to deduct such 
expenses has the potential of “turning a debtor’s fresh start into a free 
                                                                                                             
166 Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the 
Means Test the Only Way, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 678 (2005) (disagreeing 
with the argument that a judge who thinks the means test is not effective may fix it by 
substituting his or her own more stringent standards of ability to pay). 
167 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 725; In re Johnson, 454 B.R. 882, 889 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) 
(“[T]he means test must be applied in light of the debtor’s actual circumstances . . . to give 
effect to its purpose – that is, that debtors who can afford to pay their creditors should pay 
their creditors.”); In re Thompson, 457 B.R. 872, 880 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (“Allowing 
debtors to claim expenses they will not actually pay frustrates legislative intent and creates 
an inaccurate picture of their financial reality.”); In re Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. 131, 135 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012) (noting that not allowing the deduction of a secured debt payment, 
that will not in reality be made in the future, furthers the purpose of the means test which 
was intended to ensure that those who can afford to repay some portion of their unsecured 
debt be required to do so); In re Krawczyk, 2012 WL 3069437, at *5 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 
July 27, 2012) (“Essentially, the more recent line of case law prohibits a debtor from 
deducting phantom expenses to shelter income.”). 
168 See generally Johnson, 454 B.R. at 889; In re Thompson, 457 B.R. at 880-81; In re 
Sterrenberg, 471 B.R. at 135-36; In re Fredman, 471 B.R. at 540, 555; In re Krawczyk, 
2012 WL 3069437, at *4-5. 
169 In re Fredman, 471 B.R. 540, 555. 
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pass.”170 Yet other courts have highlighted that applying Ransom and 
Lanning in chapter 7 cases will give the means test a more real-world view 
as opposed to having the calculation yield a hypothetical or unrealistic 
result.171 This interpretation of the secured debt expense, however, takes 
too narrow of a view of the statute and fails to consider the entirety of the 
dismissal statute in chapter 7 consumer cases. The United States Supreme 
Court has stressed that statutory construction must be a holistic 
endeavor.172 In interpreting one part of a statute, a court must look to the 
provisions of the whole law and must also consider the object of the law 
and its policy.173 In interpreting the means test and each of its parts, 
therefore, a court must look at the entire statutory structure of section 
707(b) and consider, not only the purpose behind Congress’s enactment of 
BAPCPA or means testing generally, but also give due import to each part 
of the statute.174 
When section 707(b) of the bankruptcy code is analyzed as a whole, it 
becomes apparent that no such danger exists in chapter 7 cases.175 In 
section 707(b)(3), Congress specifically provided a second test designed 
to allow the bankruptcy court to consider post-petition changes to debtor’s 
income or expenses that impact the debtor’s capacity to pay creditors.176 It 
is through the section 707(b)(3) totality of the circumstances or bad faith 
test that post-petition fluctuations in debtor’s finances must be considered 
in chapter 7 cases; not through piece-meal adjustments by the bankruptcy 
court of the monetary income and expenses figures reported on the means 
test calculation.177 In cases where the debtor is not subject to the means 
test, passes the means test, or effectively rebuts the presumption of abuse, 
a debtor’s chapter 7 case may still be dismissed for abuse where the case 
was filed in bad faith or where a totality of circumstances demonstrate that 
debtor is able to pay some or all of his debts.178 This second test, looks at 
the chapter 7 debtor’s actual post-petition income and expenses, as well as 
                                                                                                             
170 In re White, 512 B.R. 822, 830 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014); In re Powers, 534 B.R. 207, 
210-13 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2015). 
171 In re Campbell, No. 15-13426-BFK, 2016 WL 4150663, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 
3, 2016). 
172 See generally Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or 
ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the 
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a 
whole.”). 
173 See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506 (2000) (stating that terms in a statute should 
not be construed so as to render any provision of that statute meaningless or superfluous). 
174 Id. 
175 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West 2018). 
176 Id. 
177 See generally In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007). 
178 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3) (West 2018). 
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other factors, and whether debtor’s actual or real financial circumstances 
show that debtor has the ability to pay creditors.179 
In In re Haar, for example, the bankruptcy court held that income 
made available to the debtors post-petition as a result of the surrender of 
their residence, must be considered to determine whether a totality of 
circumstances showed that debtors had the capacity to repay creditors.180 
Debtors, a husband and wife, had deducted as an expense on their means 
test mortgage payments due on their residence on the petition date.181 The 
court stated that the debtor’s ability to repay a meaningful portion of their 
unsecured debt is a prime consideration in a totality of the circumstances 
analysis under section 707(b)(3).182 The court held that because the 
surrender of debtor’s residence provided the debtors with an additional 
$1,200 per month of additional income, the totality of debtor’s finances 
indicated that debtors could pay at least some of their debt in a Chapter 13 
Plan.183 
By comparison, chapter 13 or, more specifically, section 1325 does 
not have a statutory provision comparable to section 707(b)(3) in place nor 
was that portion of section 707 selected by Congress for inclusion into 
section 1325 of the bankruptcy code.184 Accordingly, in a chapter 13 case, 
in order for the bankruptcy court to accurately determine how much of the 
debtor’s disposable income debtor can pay to unsecured creditors over a 
five year plan, the court must take into account, as Hamilton v. Lanning 
holds, changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are known or 
virtually certain on the petition date.185 Otherwise, employing a strictly 
mechanical approach to determine projected disposable income could 
deny creditors payments that the debtor could easily make in cases where 
debtor’s income is higher during the post-petition plan period than it was 
on the petition date.186 
                                                                                                             
179 In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 564 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012); In re Perelman, 419 B.R. 
168, 173 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 905, 911 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2009). 
180 In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493, 495 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007). 
181 In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493, 497 (in addition, debtors had deducted an amount equal to 
their monthly payments for real estate taxes on the property). 
182 Id. at 498. 
183 In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493, 500; see also In re Perelman, 419 B.R. 168, 173 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the debtor could take the secured debt deductions on his 
means test despite his intention to surrender the collateral, but that the fact that the debtor 
was not making payments on the secured debts could be considered by the court under 
section 707(b)(3)). 
184 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (West 2018). 
185 Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 509. 
186 Id. at 519 (agreeing with the United States Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit’s 
opinion that “a court taking the forward-looking approach should begin by calculating 
disposable income . . . It is only in unusual cases that a court may go further and take into 
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The fact that section 1325 of the bankruptcy code incorporates by 
reference the means test calculation for the purpose of determining a 
debtor’s disposable income and that the United States Supreme Court has 
held that, in certain limited chapter 13 cases, a bankruptcy court must 
account for changes in the debtor’s finances that are known on the petition 
date does not, by extension, give rise to the inference that the secured debt 
expense should be given a forward-looking application in chapter 7 cases. 
Just as post-petition changes to a debtor’s income are not considered in 
chapter 7 cases by simply having a bankruptcy court adjust the debtor’s 
CMI on the section 707(b)(2) means test, neither should post-petition 
changes to debtor’s expenses be accounted for in this manner. In chapter 
7 cases, Congress provided and built into the dismissal statute the 
exclusive mechanism through which post-petition changes to the debtor’s 
finances must be considered–the additional abuse tests of section 
707(b)(3). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Careful analysis of the statutory text of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) 
shows that the language of the statute is clear. Its plain meaning allows a 
debtor the benefit of the secured debt expense in chapter 7 bankruptcy 
cases irrespective of debtor’s intent to surrender the collateral post-
petition.187 Moreover, a contextual analysis of section 707(b) proves that 
means testing in chapter 7 bankruptcy cases is incompatible with the 
forward looking or reality based application increasingly being given to 
the statute by some bankruptcy courts. Having anticipated that the results 
of the means testing in chapter 7 cases may not always accurately reflect 
debtor’s real repayment capacity, Congress provided additional 
mechanisms, specifically the totality of the circumstances and bad faith 
tests of section 707(b)(3), through which the United States Trustee could 
look beyond the numbers in the means test calculation to assess debtor’s 
real finances and more accurately gauge debtor’s ability to pay 
creditors.188 The inclusion of these tests in section 707 allows bankruptcy 
courts to more aptly use its judicial discretion to assess the reality of 
debtor’s financial situation and its impact on debtor’s ability to pay.189 
                                                                                                             
account other known or virtually certain information about the debtor’s future income or 
expenses.”). 
187 See In re Ralston, 400 B.R. 854, 860-61 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Almost every court 
that has addressed this statute has determined that it is not ambiguous.”). 
188 See In re Denzin, 534 B.R. at 886-87. 
189 In re Perrotta, 390 B.R. 26, 30-31 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008); In re Hartwick, 359 B.R. 16, 
21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007). 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 213 
 
When viewed as a whole, the structure of section 707(b) clearly 
conveys congress’s intent to create three separate and distinct tests for 
abuse in chapter 7 cases: The means test, which directs a court to presume 
that abuse exists when debtor’s disposable income is above the statutory 
threshold; the totality of circumstances test, pursuant to which a court may 
dismiss debtor’s case for abuse when the facts of the case show debtor’s 
ability to pay his debts; and a bad faith test pursuant to which a court may 
dismiss a bankruptcy case for abuse when there is evidence that a debtor 
has manipulated the bankruptcy process in some illicit way including 
evidence that debtor has tried to maliciously thwart a creditor’s efforts to 
collect on a debt.190 When the statutory structure of chapter 7’s dismissal 
provision is considered as a whole, it becomes clear that allowing a debtor 
the benefit of the secured debt expense on the means test calculation even 
when that expense will not be actually incurred post-petition does not give 
debtor a free pass or allow the debtor to impermissibly game the system. 
Instead, it allows the means test calculation to be used by the bankruptcy 
courts as Congress intended: as a screening mechanism to determine 
whether a chapter 7 proceeding is appropriate on the petition date, while 
holding the United States Trustee to his evidentiary burden of having to 
prove abuse through a totality of circumstances analysis where factors 
outside of the means test calculation, such as post-petition changes in 
debtor’s income or expenses, indicate that debtor may have the ability to 
pay some or all of his debts.191 
Furthermore, bankruptcy courts need not disregard congressional 
intent when interpreting the dismissal provision applicable to chapter 7 
cases; courts need only consider the statute in its entirety giving due import 
to each of the abuse tests created by Congress to ensure that, while debtors 
pay the maximum they can afford, honest debtors are afforded access to 
the bankruptcy protection they seek. When this is done, the apparent 
                                                                                                             
190 In re Haar, 373 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (“As its introductory language 
imparts, [section] 707(b)(3) is a subordinate paragraph, utilized when determining whether 
a case should be dismissed under [section] 707(b)(1), the primary provision governing 
dismissal. In this way, [section] 707(b)(3) is but one of two subordinate paragraphs used 
to determine whether a case should be dismissed for abuse pursuant to [section] 707(b)(1). 
The other, contained in [section] 707(b)(2), sets forth a formulaic approach, known as the 
‘means test,’ whereby a court is directed to presume that abuse exists if an ability to pay 
threshold is met.”); In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 567 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[T]he Means 
Test is only the first step of a two-tiered inquiry under [section] 707(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, and the two-tiered process shows that a debtor’s deductions on the Means Test 
should be determined as of the petition date.”). 
191 See generally In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (“Since a 
determination of the appropriate proceeding should be made as of the petition date, a 
debtor’s deductions from income on the means test should also be determined as of the 
petition date.”). 
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incongruity between the statutory language of the chapter 7 dismissal 
statute and the congressional intent of ensuring that debtors that can afford 
to pay their debts do so, disappears.  
